The Enron Collapse and Criminal Liabilities of Auditors and Lawyers for Defective Prospectuses in the United States, Australia and Canada: a Review by Solaiman, S.M.
* Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia.
81
THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES OF
AUDITORS AND LAWYERS FOR DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES IN
THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA AND CANADA:  A REVIEW
S.M. Solaiman*
Abstract
A lack of uniformity in laws regulating professionals such as auditors and
lawyers in relation to defective prospectuses exists across nations around the
world.  Securities legislation of some jurisdictions clearly imposes criminal
liabilities for defective prospectuses on professionals along with directors and
promoters of the issuer of securities.  But the laws of some other countries are
ambiguous in this regard.  Such an ambiguity is present in the securities
legislation of the United States, Australia and Canada.  Their legislation does
not categorically name the persons who should be criminally liable for a
defective prospectus; nonetheless auditors and lawyers are sometimes caught
by virtue of judicial interpretations of those vague legal provisions.  Even
though they could be on the hook under such interpretations, legislation
provides a wide range of defences that facilitate escaping liabilities by
offenders at the expense of the integrity of the market.  Regarding sanctions,
although the term of imprisonment is identical in all these three jurisdictions,
pecuniary penalties significantly vary after the recent reforms triggered by
some spectacular corporate bankruptcy taking place especially in the U.S.
and Australia.  Most importantly, the post-Enron reforms explicitly amend the
laws governing secondary securities markets, and therefore their application
to defective prospectuses is questionable except for the Canadian reforms.  If
the post-Enron reforms do not really touch the prospectus liability regimes in
the U.S. and Australia, it can be said that the lawmakers have ignored their
primary securities markets.  If this is so, it would be an unwise policy to wait
for an Enron-type disaster to occur in the IPO market for stimulus to initiate
reforms addressing professional malpractices in the preparation of
prospectuses.  If not, the law should make it clear before it is too late.
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1. For example, Enron and WorldCom collapses in the U.S. and HIH and One Tel collapses in
Australia.  For analytical discussions of these collapses, see Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to
Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT’L L.J. 367 (2005); Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make
Miserable Policemen:  Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725
(2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just
Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 917 (2003); Roman Tomasic, Current Development and Notes:  Corporate
Collapse, Crime and Governance—Enron, Anderson and Beyond, 14 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
2. The term “accountants” in this study refers to those who are certified public accountants and
perform audit services for companies willing to go public.
3. See Anita Indira Anand, Shareholder Isolation and the Regulation of Auditors, 54 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1, 1 (2004); H. Garfield Emerson & Geoff A. Clarke, Address at the 3rd Annual Directors’ Governace
Summit:  Bill 198 and Ontario’s Securities Act:  Giving Investors and The OSC Added Muscle, available
at http://www.fasken.com/WEB/fmdwebsite.nsf/AllDoc/A69604E494A1AD7685256DDD0058D3E3/
$File/BILL198.PDF!OpenElement.  New reforms will be introduced later in this paper.
4. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET  AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCT IONAL APPROACH 212 (2004).
5. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (2d ed. 1988).
6. Louis Loss, Emeritus Law Professor, Securities Law Specialist, Dies at 83, HARV. UNIV .
GAZETTE, Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1998/01.15/LouisLoss
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of several recent appalling corporate failures in some
developed countries,1 the concern for the regulation of accountants2 has gained
a fresh stimulus, which is evident in the current academic debates and
corresponding legislative reforms being made in the United States, Australia
and Canada.3  Investor confidence is the Holy Grail of the successful operation
of securities markets around the world and adequate measures for investor
protection are central to this confidence in the market.
Every jurisdiction adopts certain strategies for protecting the investing
public from abusive practices in securities markets.  Mandatory disclosure
requirement comes ahead of all other strategies.4  The creation and
maintenance of investor confidence in a market are greatly dependent on the
integrity of the market, which is demonstrated through the timely and credible
disclosure of material facts facilitating informed investment decisions.
Disclosures in prospectuses aim to eliminate information asymmetry between
corporations and their prospective investors.  This elimination may be possible
only through full, fair and timely disclosures of material facts and their
utilisation by the investing public.  But in reality, the notion of ensuring full
and fair disclosure may seem to be largely illusive, perhaps owing to the fact
that “problems at which modern securities regulation is directed are as old as
the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers,”5 as observed by Professor
Louis Loss, the intellectual father of securities law in the United States.6
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Emerit.html.
7. Neil Mohindra, Securities Market Regulation in Canada, FRASER INST. CRITICAL ISSUES BULL.,
Apr. 2002, at 36, available at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=317.
8. See Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 610
(1963).
9.  INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION i
(2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf.
10. Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors:  Why the Second
Circuit’s “Bright Line” Standard Should Prevail, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1607, 1608 (2000).
11. Alan C. Michaels, Fastow and Arthur Andersen:  Some Reflections on Corporate Criminality,
Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM . L. 551, 551 (2004).
12. Wynne, supra note 10, at 1607.
13. David F. Birke, The Toothless Watchdog:  Corporate Fraud and the Independent Audit—How
Can the Public’s Confidence Be Restored?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 891, 916 (2004).
14. Id. at 891-92.
15. R. Webb, Auditors Must Share Blame—Bosch, AUSTL. FIN. REV. June 11, 1991.
16. For a detailed discussion of auditor liability in Canada, see Grace Hession, Auditor
Independence and Liability in Canada:  Are We Ready for Third Party Liability?, 36 U. BRIT. COLUMB.
Sometimes it is clearly admitted that the eradication of securities fraud
and manipulation is impossible.7  However, corporate abusive practices may
be minimised to a reasonable extent by effective regulation of market players.
With this end in view, securities regulation commenced in the early eighteenth
century;8 and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) set out the objectives of securities regulation as:  protecting
investors, ensuing market fairness and efficiency and reducing systemic risks.9
Despite some instances of regulatory failures in securities markets, the
regulation of market players is now considered essential for investor
protection,10 and criminal sanctions now play a pivotal role in policing
corporations.11
It has been argued that investors have the right to receive accurate
disclosures and the persons who are at fault in infringing on that right “should
be held liable, whether they are primary or secondary actors.”12  In addressing
the post-Enron situation, the United States Congress has explained that
auditors play the role of guardian of the securities market,13 and lawmakers
were arguably forced to enact new legislation predominantly concerning
accounting professionals in order to protect investors from the market
misfeasance in the wake of the collapse of corporate giants.14  Referring to the
corporate collapses in Australia in the 1980s, Bosch (the former chairman of
the Australian securities watchdog) observed that auditors must be blamed for
misleading or outrageous disclosure by corporations.15  There has been a
demand for enhanced liability of accountants in Canada following the effects
of the Enron incident on domestic markets.16  Legislative initiatives have been
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L. REV. 575 (2003).
17. For the purposes of this study, the phrase “defective prospectus” means a prospectus which
contains misleading and deceptive statements or omits to state a material fact which was required to be
stated under the relevant law.
18. The reasons for choosing Ontario jurisdiction from Canada will be discussed in the methodology
section below.
19. Although the Securities Act was enacted in 1933, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
was established under the Securities Exchange Act 1934.
20. Blue Sky Laws as described by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:
Every state has its own securities laws—commonly known as “Blue Sky Laws”—that are designed
to protect investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities.  While these laws can vary from
state to state, most states [sic] laws typically require companies making small offerings to register
their offerings before they can be sold in a particular state.  The laws also license brokerage firms,
their brokers, and investment adviser representatives.
U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, BLUE SKY LAWS, available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm.  For
details of the blue sky laws, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70
TEX. L. REV. 347 (1991); Conrad G. Goodkind, Blue Sky Law:  Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements?,
1976 WIS. L. REV. 79.
undertaken in many countries for increasing and widening accountants’
liability for defective disclosures with a core assumption that fair financial
reporting could have prevented those failures and thereby protected investors
and other stakeholders.  This article deals with the criminal liabilities of
auditors and lawyers for “defective prospectuses”17 in the United States
Australia and Canada.18  It focuses on the similarities and differences between
these three jurisdictions in respect of provisions concerning criminal liabilities
of auditors and lawyers under securities law with special reference to post-
Enron legal reforms, defences available to this liability and penalties
applicable to prospectus criminal offences.
METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS
The U.S., Australia and Canada have been chosen for this comparative
review because of their similarities in legal traditions, regulatory philosophies
and reform measures undertaken following the Enron collapse.  They belong
to the common law family, follow a mandatory disclosure regime and have
enacted new legislation to address the regulatory problems relevant to the
post-Enron securities market.  Although securities regulation in all of these
federations was initially effected at state or provincial level, some significant
changes have taken place in their regulatory approach over the past few
decades.  The U.S. in 1934 introduced federal regulation19 under the Securities
Act 1933 (SA’33) and Securities Act 1934 (SEA’34) alongside the pre-existing
state regulation which is effected under blue sky laws.20  Australia completely
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21. The Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) is an independent Australian
government body which has regulated securities markets since January 1991.  Initially called the Australian
Securities Commission (ASC), it was renamed as ASIC in July 1998 when its responsibilities were extended
to consumer protection in superannuation, insurance and deposit taking.  AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N,
ABOUT ASIC, available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/About+ASIC?opendocument.
22. MARY G. CONDON  ET AL., SECURITIES LAW IN CANADA:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 112 (2005).
23. Paul Latimer, Securities Regulation—Canadian Lessons for Australian Regulation, 13 AUSTL.
J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2001).
24. Id.
25. DAVID  L. JOHNSTON & KATHLEEN DOYLE ROCKW ELL, CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION 10
(3d ed. 2003).
abolished its state regulation, replacing with federal regulation of securities
through the establishment of the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC) in 1991.21  Although there has been an effort to unify
securities law and regulation in Canada, it is still following securities
regulation at province and territory levels.22  However, Canadian Securities
Administrators (CSA), a forum of Canadian securities regulators, has been
“providing for regulatory cooperation, harmonisation of regulatory standards,
coordination of rules and dealing with regulatory issues of common
interest.”23  The CSA is publicly known as the “virtual” national regulator
although no one stop securities regulator exists in Canada.24  Ontario has been
chosen from amongst the 13 jurisdictions in Canada for this paper mainly
because it is the largest and most prominent jurisdiction for the purpose of
securities regulation in Canada.25
Both primary and secondary materials are used in this article.  In addition
to published materials, some eminent scholars are consulted for the clarity and
applicability of recent development in these three jurisdictions.
Criminal liabilities for defective prospectuses are imposed under both
securities law and criminal law.  This study is concerned with the liabilities
under securities law that can be enforced through judicial actions.
Administrative actions against prospectus offences and liabilities under
criminal law fall beyond this article.
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26. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers:  A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 491 (2001).
27. Martin Markovic, Auditors’ Criminal Liability:  Another Approach, 6 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 65
(1995).
28. Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, “Deja Vu All Over Again” The Securities and Exchange
Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting Profession through Rule 102(e) of Its Rules
of Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 553, 556.
29. Constance Frisby Fain, Accountant Liability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 355, 358 (1994); see also
Brian K. Kirby & Thomas L. Davies, Accountant Liability:  New Exposure for an Old Profession, 36 S.D.
L. REV. 574, 577 (1991).
30. Frank J. Macchiarola, The Accountant’s Liability Controversy, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 177,
179.
31. Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants’ Liability, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 213, 213 (citing DAVID N. RICCHIUTE, ACCOUNTING CONCEPT AND STANDARDS 6 (1982)).
32. Hession, supra note 16, at 617.
33. Id.
34. Gossman, supra note 31, at 213-14.
PROFESSIONALS’ RESPONSIBILITIES TRIGGERING CRIMINAL LIABILITIES FOR
DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES
Auditors’ Responsibilities
Accountancy is a thriving profession which is able to act as “private
gatekeeper” to the capital market.26  It has been argued that accountants play
a vital role in presenting distorted financial reports of corporations to the
public.27  The role of auditors is perhaps the most significant of all the various
functions performed by accountants in society.28  The primary role of an
auditor “is to review, analyze, and determine the validity” of the claims
intended to be made by his/her client in the prospectus.29  More importantly,
auditors are sometimes considered to be independent guarantors of truth and
fairness in the financial disclosure of corporations.30  Generally, auditing of
corporate financial statements is intended to show the true financial health of
the entity to third parties such as securities regulators, creditors and present
and prospective investors through making a fair presentation of the
companies’ financial affairs.31  Consistently, it is a reality in the securities
market that investors use the audited financial statements for investment
purposes and thereby firms raise capital from the public.32  Auditing is thus
central to the public confidence in financial disclosures; absent this
confidence, “the capital will dry up and the system will be crippled.”33  This
is so because an auditor is considered to be an intermediary between firms and
investors in respect of corporate financial statements.34  In other words,
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35. See Anand, supra note 3, at 5.
36. See James H. Thompson & Laurie J. Henry, Professional Liability Insurance:  Go Bare or Not?,
172 J. ACCT. 111, 111 (1991).
37. See David A. Olsen, Let’s Have Fair Play for the CPA, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1991, at F13.
38. Id.
39. Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public
Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 549 (1996).
40. John C. Coffee Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1293, 1296 (2003).
41. Id. at 1296-97.
42. For details of these roles, see id. at 1302-14.  See also Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Primary
Liability of Securities Lawyers, 50 SMU L. REV. 383 (1996).
43. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1312.
44. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9
auditors are theoretically “an arm’s-length third party” and they are supposed
to work beyond any undue management pressures.35
Therefore, auditors have an extremely significant role to play in making
reliable corporate disclosures to the public in the market for initial public
offerings (IPOs).  In appreciation of that role, suits for professional
misconduct against accountants have amplified dramatically over the past two
decades,36 where they are often sued by third parties who suffered loss by
relying upon the audited financial statements of companies.37  Although the
victims of a corporate failure may sue others such as directors, lawyers, and
underwriters, accountants are especially targeted for lawsuits where the failed
entity recently received a positive audit report.38
Lawyers’ Responsibilities
Lawyers are primarily responsible for the verification of the legal
requirements for the prospectus although they get involved in the process of
an IPO at a much later stage than that of the auditors.39  However, both
lawyers and auditors are generally regarded as “gatekeepers.”  Coffee defines
the term “gatekeeper” as “independent professionals who serve investors by
preparing, verifying, or assessing the disclosures that they receive.”40
Regarding the function of securities lawyers, he maintains that they provide
an opinion to the underwriter that the prospectus contains all material
information in relation to the issue and issuer.41  He argues that securities
lawyers perform multiple roles such as:  advocate, engineer and gatekeeper.42
He asserts that “the attorney is the field marshall of the disclosure process.”43
In discussing professionals’ roles in the context of Enron, Rhode and Paton
argue that lawyers “passively acquiesce in client fraud.”44
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(2002).
45. See Schneider v. Traweek, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,419, 1990 WL 132716, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 31, 1990).
46. For a discussion of such a debate, see Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside
Professionals:  Are Lawyers and Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 473, 477-80 (1997).
47. See Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 BUS. LAW. 1429, 1442 (1994).
48. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks Inc. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best
Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994); In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp.
974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
49. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).  Although this observation was made under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5 which applies to the secondary market, the observation should be still
relevant to the disclosure in prospectuses in respect of imposing liability on individuals.
In brief, lawyers provide advice to issuers of securities on the legal
requirements of disclosures in prospectuses and certify the compliance with
the relevant law.  Investors are believed to buy securities based on those
disclosures.  At the same time lawyers are also responsible to make the issuer
aware of legal requirements and consequences of noncompliance.  Therefore
they play a significant role in respect of an IPO and they could be held liable
for inaccurate advice.45
RATIONALE FOR PROFESSIONALS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PROSPECTUSES
Rationale for Auditors’ Criminal Liability
The rationale of the imposition of liability on outside professionals such
as auditors and lawyers was debated extensively in the early 1990s.46  But
opponents’ arguments could not prevent accountants’ liability for defective
disclosure by corporations and therefore proponents’ arguments eventually
prevail.47  Auditors’ liability is attributable to their “substantial participation”
or “intricate involvement” in the preparation of a prospectus.48  The U.S.
Supreme Court in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank noted that secondary
actors in the securities market may be held liable as primary violators where
“any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs
a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on
which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be held liable as primary
violator. . . .”49  Langevoort argues that outside professionals such as
accountants and lawyers often have much influence over corporate
disclosures, in terms of both forms and contents, which can deceive investors,
and therefore they should be made liable for defective disclosure even though
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50. Donald C. Langevoort, Words From on High about Rule 10b-5; Chiarella’s History:  Central
Bank’s Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 891-92 (1995).
51. Timothy M. Metzger, Comment, Abandoning Accountant’s Liability for Aiding and Abetting
10b-5 Securities Fraud, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1374, 1405 (1993).  For the application of Rule 10b-5 to
prospectus disclosures and holding accountants liable under this Rule, see SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d
1301, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1982).  See also SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1269-71 (D.D.C. 1978); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. Lawrence R. Bard, A Distinct-Responsibility Approach to Accountants’ Primary Liability Under
Rule 10b-5, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 193, 220 (1992).  With respect to fraudulent activity such as
misrepresentations, omissions and schemes to defraud under securities law (§ 10(b) of the Security
Exchange Act of 1934), the judiciary recognizes two types of civil liability:  primary and secondary.
Primary liability is imposed on those who directly violate securities law, whilst secondary liability is
ascribed to those who provide substantial assistance to the direct violators.  See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d
909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980).
53. Roman Tomasic, Auditors and the Reporting of Illegality and Financial Fraud, 20 AUST. BUS.
L. REV. 198, 198 (1992).
54. Warren, supra note 42, at 387.
their roles may be sometimes less direct.50  Although courts had difficulty in
the past in resolving the issue of accountants’ liability for a securities
transaction, the modern judicial pronouncements clearly recognise that “if an
accountant had fraudulently certified materially misleading financial
statements that were placed in a prospectus distributed to the investing public,
a court would find a sufficient connection with the securities transaction to
warrant liability.”51  This liability is of a primary nature.  This is because an
audit report is argued to be an actual representation and therefore auditors are
exposed to primary liability for defective disclosures, although other aspects
of the functions of a certified public accountant such as the preparation of
financial statements may trigger secondary liability.52
In line with the current arguments for accountants’ or auditors’ liabilities,
Tomasic, by referring to the wave of corporate collapse of the 1980s, observes
that they (auditors) are easily blamed for corporate failures.53  Now the
situation has become even worse.  Although auditors have for a long time been
held liable for defective prospectuses, their statutory liabilities have not yet
been clearly articulated in the legislation of many countries.  As a result, their
conviction largely depends upon the judicial approach to the interpretation of
a particular offence committed in relation to prospectus disclosures.
Rationale for Lawyers’ Criminal Liability
Securities regulation involves complicated laws and procedures; given
that complexity, lawyers’ role concerning an IPO is critical.54  Failure of
lawyers to perform their role properly ultimately helps the issuer commit
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55. Harrison, supra note 46, at 537.
56. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Controlling Person Liability Under Section 20(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act and Section 15 of the Securities Act, 53 BUS. LAW. 1 (1997).  Section 15
of the Securities Act 1933 (US) is applicable to §§ 11 and 12, which imposes liability on various persons
including current and future or prospective directors of the issuers of IPOs.  Hence, the controlling persons’
liability as set forth in § 15 is quite relevant.
57. See generally Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Molecular Tech.
Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 913-19 (6th Cir. 1991).
58. Royce de R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments in Clients:  An
Empirical Assessment, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 379, 382 (2002).
59. See In re ZZZZ Best Co. Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
60. Gossman, supra note 31, at 215.
61. Kirsten L. Thompson, Liability of Professionals, Officers, and Directors:  Annual Survey, 28
TORT & INS. L.J. 376, 377 (1993).
62. Perhaps the New York Supreme Court first broke the English tradition of the privity of contract
in Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns 116 (1806).
63. Thompson, supra note 61, at 377-78.  See also New Orleans Sheet Metal Worker’s v. ABC Ins.
Co., 599 So. 2d 868 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1992).
64. Id. at 376.
offences.55  This is so because the issuer could not have issued the prospectus
to the public had the lawyer warned the issuer of defects in the prospectus.
Thus lawyers are in a position to prevent the issuer from going public with a
defective prospectus.56  Hence lawyers should be held liable for defective
prospectuses and they are sometimes considered primary violators for material
misstatements or omissions included in prospectuses.57
It is also argued that professionals such as lawyers, auditors and
underwriters may be held liable for mere participation in the process of
prospectus preparation, because their participation “can provide an implicit
certification” to the investing public about the accuracy of disclosures.58
Similarly, in dealing with a case involving deceptive conduct in connection of
the sale of securities, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California held that simple participation of professionals might trigger
liability.59
Auditors and lawyers are exposed to both civil and criminal liabilities for
their faults committed in providing their professional service.60  Historically
a debate emerged regarding their civil liability, based on the doctrine of
privity of contract, that this liability was limited to parties to the contract in
exclusion of third parties who became victim of the accountants’ or lawyers’
wrongs.61  That notion has changed over time62 and professionals’ fiduciary
duty of care has been extended by the judiciary to non-clients third parties
who are adversely affected by their professional services.63  Even some
jurisdictions have extended this duty to the public in general.64  In so doing the
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65. San Sebastian Proprietary Ltd. v. Minister Administering the Envtl. Planning & Assessment Act
1979 (1986) 162 C.L.R. 340, 357 (Austl.); Hawkins v. Clayton, (1988) 164 C.L.R. 539, 580 (Austl.);
Esanda Fin. Corp. v. Peat Marwick Hungerfords, (1997) 188 C.L.R. 241, 265 (Austl.).
66. Hercules Mgmt. v. Ernst & Young, (1997) 2 S.C.R. 165 (Can.); Haig v. Bamford, (1976) 1
S.C.R. 466 (Can.).
67. (1964) A.C. 465, 486 (U.K.).
68. See, e.g., Esanda Fin. Corp. v. Peat Marwick Hungerfords, (1997) 188 C.L.R. 241, 265;
Edwards Karwacki Smith & Co. v. Jacka Nominees Proprietary Ltd., (1994) 15 A.C.S.R. 502 (Austl.);
Meadow Gem Proprietary Ltd. v. ANZ Ex’rs & Tr. Co., (1996) 2 V.R. 26 (Austl.).
69. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
70. Larry Catá Backer, The Duty to Monitor:  Emerging Obligations of Outside Lawyers and
Auditors to Detect and Report Corporate Wrongdoing Beyond the Federal Securities Laws, 77 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 919, 984 n.285 (2003).
courts have adopted the principle of third party beneficiary rights.  Therefore,
professionals are civilly liable to the third party beneficiaries of their report
in the United Sates, Australia65 and Canada.66  In this regard, the House of
Lords in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd. pronounced that
professionals owe a duty of care to their clients and also to the third parties
and therefore are civilly liable to them.67  Australia adopted this view, evident
in the judgments in several recent cases by the High Court of Australia.68
Thus auditors and lawyers are now exposed to an extended civil liability
regime.  However, the doctrine of privity is not quite relevant to the discussion
of this article because criminal liability is premised on the wrong committed
against the society or state as a whole, rather than against any individuals.
To distinguish between these two, it can be briefly described that civil
liability aims to compensate the persons who incurred loss or damage by
relying on audited financial statements included in a prospectus; whereas
criminal liabilities purport to save the society by deterring the delinquent
accountants.  Criminal liabilities are imposed by statutes such as securities
legislation and the law of crimes; whilst civil liabilities are ascribed under
both the law of tort and statutes such as contract law and securities law.
Regarding criminal liability, since the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,69
accountants and lawyers are no longer an aider or abettor for the violation of
securities law.  However they can still be prosecuted as aider or abettor under
criminal law.70  Auditors and lawyers can be prosecuted as principal violators
of securities law as will be discussed below.
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71. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, U.S. Capital Markets in the
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley World:  Why Our Markets Should Matter to Foreign Issuers (Jan. 25, 2005), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch012505whd.htm.
72. Peter L. Welsh, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cost of Criminalization, 8 SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP. 20,
1 (2003).
73. SHANNON ROSE SELDEN, FIGHTING FRAUD ON FAITH:  FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION AND
THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE 62 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/expresso/eps/746.
74. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002).
75. For a brief discussion of the requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, see JOHN C. COFFEE,
JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 2-39 (9th ed. 2005); Backer,
supra note 71, at 939-40.
INTRODUCTION TO POST-ENRON LEGAL REFORMS
The most prominent piece of legislation has been enacted following the
Enron effects in the U.S.  In 2002, the Congress passed the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, popularly known as
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX’02) in order to heighten transparency in the
corporate sector.  According to the Chairman of the U.S. SEC, the SOX’02 is
“the most significant piece of securities legislation” in the past 70 years.71
The U.S. President himself proclaimed that “[m]y administration pressed for
greater corporate integrity.  A united Congress has written it into law.  And
today I sign the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices
since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”72
The SOX’02 was legislated in “response to the massive accounting frauds
at companies,” and it concentrated on “improving the accounting oversight of
publicly traded companies.”73  Perhaps the greatest emphasis has been given
under the SOX’02 to addressing corporate accounting issues in a bid to protect
investors and regain public confidence in the market.  Under section 101(a),
the SOX’02 creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a new federal agency to oversee accounting firms that perform
corporate audits.  A set of new rules and procedures for auditors and issuers
has also been included in this legislation.74  It also requires certification of
accuracy of companies’ financial statements on a continuing basis by the
CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) of a reporting company; failure of
which triggers enhanced criminal sanctions.75
Section 307 of the SOX’02 specifically imposes responsibility on
lawyers.  It empowers the SEC to issue rules “setting forth minimum standards
of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers.”  An attorney under
this section is required “to report evidence of material violation of securities
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76. Erica Gann, Note, Judicial Action in Retrograde:  The Case for Applying Section 804 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to All Fraud Actions under the Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1059 (2004).
77. For arguments in favour of its application to cases under the SA’93, see id. (dealing with only
limitation issue and courts did not agree with those arguments as I have been advised through some
personal contact.  Experts whose opinions have been gathered through personal communications are not
mentioned at this stage.).
78. The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act
2004, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/comact/browse/TOCN.htm, considerably deals with the
regulation of auditors and auditing of companies, and continuing disclosure relevant to the secondary
law, or fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent
thereof.”  Lawyers should submit their reports to either the chief legal counsel
or the CEO or the equivalent thereof as required under section 307(1).
Making such a report alone does not relieve lawyers from their obligations.
Section 307(2) provides that if the person who receives the report does not act
properly on the evidence reported, lawyers are required to report further “to
the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another
committee of the board of directors comprised solely of directors not
employed directly or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors.”  A
failure in making such a report will eventually make the attorney liable both
civilly and criminally.
The SOX’02 amends the provisions of the SEA’34, the basic legislation
governing the secondary securities market in the U.S., whilst the primary
market is governed under, inter alia, the SA’33.  It is not clear why the
SOX’02 did not change any provision of the SA’33.  One reason may be that
the scandals that tempted the Congress to make new law took place in the U.S.
secondary market.  Whatever may be the reason, its silence about the
amendment to the SA’33 generates doubts whether this legislation applies to
a defective prospectus which contains audited financial statements and an
audit report to that effect.  The intent of the Congress in this regard is not clear
and it seems that “the courts are left to divine Congress’s ultimate intent.”76
Although a case reference of its application to a defective prospectus is yet to
be found, some experts in U.S. securities law are of the opinion that the
SOX’02 may be applicable to defective prospectuses in some respects.
Relying on those expert opinions, we will assume for this study that the
SOX’02 applies to defective prospectuses although it is still uncertain.77  Penal
provisions of this legislation will be discussed in later appropriate sections
from relevant aspects.
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERPA’04) is considered to be the
Australian equivalent of the SOX’02.78  This law was legislated following the
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securities market.  Some of the provisions of this Act will be discussed later in this paper.
79. JAMES MCCON VILL, AN INTRODUCTION TO CLERP 9 (2004).
80. Id.
81. Emerson & Clarke, supra note 3.
debate over the regulation of auditors and corporate governance systems79
generated by the concentrated period during 2001-2002 of corporate collapses
in the U.S. and Australia as alluded to earlier.  The objective of the
CLERPA’04 as stated by the government is “to ensure that business regulation
is consistent with promoting a strong and vibrant economy and provides a
framework which assists business in adapting to change.”80  The CLERPA’04
particularly amended the requirements of publicly listed companies and deals
considerably with, amongst other things, the regulation of auditors and
auditing of companies, continuing corporate disclosure which is relevant to
the secondary securities market.  Similar to the SOX’02, the applicability of
the CLERPA’04 to the prospectus disclosure requirements is questionable.
However, in response to personal contact with this writer, experts of
Australian securities law are of the view that the CLERPA’04 does not apply
to prospectus disclosures and the prospectus regime was adequately amended
by the Corporate Law Economic Law Reform Program Act 1999
(CLERPA’99) which was given effect from 13 March 2000.
The CLERPA’04 is basically a part of the major corporate law reform
program undertaken by the federal government under which the CLERPA’99
was enacted.  Incidentally the CLERPA’04 came into existence after the
incidents of some spectacular publicly traded corporate failures.  Therefore it
primarily addresses the issues of disclosures by companies listed on the stock
exchanges.  It significantly reformed the corporate fund-raising regime and the
CLERPA’04 does not explicitly amend any provisions of the Corporations
Act 2001 (CA’01) governing prospectus criminal liabilities.  Based on both the
expert opinions consulted and the explanations given above, it is assumed in
this study that the CLERPA’04 does not affect the subject matter of this
article and therefore no post-Enron reforms in Australia are relevant to this
discussion.  However, such inaction will be discussed in this study in
reference to the other two jurisdictions.
Compared to the U.S. and Australian reforms, the post-Enron reforms in
Canada are very clear regarding their applicability to prospectus liabilities.
The U.S. corporate scandals impacted Canada.  Following the path of the U.S.
government, the Ontario government tabled Bill 198 for reforms aimed at
regaining investor confidence shattered by the U.S. corporate disasters
coupled with some domestic incidents.81  The Bill was known as An Act to
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L. REV. 1183 at 1183 (1995).
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implement Budget measures and other initiatives of the Government.  The
short title of the Act is Keeping the Promise for a Strong Economy Act
(Budget Measures) 2002 (BMA’02).  It amended various provisions of the
Ontario Securities Act 1990, R S O (OSA’90).  Some of the most important
of those reforms are mentioned below.  As regards criminal offences
concerning securities, the BMA’02 makes significant reforms by adding
sections 126.1 and 126.2 to the OSA’90, imposing prohibitions on fraudulent
and deceptive conduct in offering securities by individuals or corporations.82
The BMA’02 also enhanced penalties for offences regarding prospectus
disclosures.  These are discussed below.
LEGAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING PROSPECTUS CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
In the aftermath of the stock market debacle in October 1929 in the U.S.,
the Securities Act 1933 (SA’33) introduced securities regulation at federal
level alongside the preexisting state regulation.  The SA’33 incorporated the
disclosure philosophy for the first time in the United States.  As expounded
by the U.S. Supreme Court, the fundamental purpose of the federal securities
laws is “to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor.”83  Previously the U.S. securities markets had been regulated
by respective state regulatory bodies alone, in pursuance of the paternalistic
merit philosophy.  The Congress passed the SA’33 “to protect investors during
the initial offering of a security.”84  One of the prime purposes of the SA’33
is “to provide the investor with enough information to make a sound economic
decision in purchasing a security.”85
Under section 6 of the SA’33, a company willing to go public is required
to register its registration statement or prospectus with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (US-SEC).  Section 10 of this Act prescribes the
information to be included in a prospectus.  The prescribed contents include
all material information regarding the nature of the securities, issue and issuer
necessary for making educated investment decisions.  It follows a “general
disclosure test.”  Sections 17 and 24 make fraudulent and deceptive
disclosures an offence.  The SA’33 ascribes both civil and criminal liabilities
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86. See Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11-12 (1933) (describes civil liabilities for defective prospectus).
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88. Section 728(1) does not actually use the term “prospectus.”  Instead it uses “disclosure
documents” which include:  “Prospectuses, short-form prospectuses, profile statements and offer
information statements.”  Corporations Act, 2001, c. 6D, § 709 (2005) (Austl.).  “Prospectus” is a common
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study to denote all sorts of disclosure documents issued by corporations for the purposes of initial public
offerings.
89. Corporations Act, 2001, c. 6D, § 728(1) (Austl.).
for a defective prospectus.86  Regarding criminal liabilities for defective
prospectuses, section 24 of the SA’33, as quoted in the next section, imposes
liability on any person who willfully violates prospectus requirements set out
in this Act or in any bylaws promulgated thereunder.
Although this section does not categorically identify the persons who are
liable for committing an offence, numerous judicial interpretations of this
section have vividly specified that all members of a coalition of the prospectus
are criminally liable for defective disclosure in a registration statement.  The
coverage of the above expression “any person” is discussed below, which will
demonstrate that auditors and lawyers could be caught under criminal liability
entrenched in the SA’33.  In addition, they (auditors and lawyers) can be sued
as principal violators under the SOX’02.87
In Australia, disclosure requirements in prospectuses are governed under
Chapter 6D of the CA’01.  Under this Chapter, section 728(1) provides that
a person must not offer securities to the public under a prospectus88 which
includes misleading or deceptive statements or omits material information
required by 710, 711, 712, 713, 714 or 715 of this Act from the prospectus.89
These sections set out some general and specific disclosure tests.  For
example, section 710 provides that a prospectus must contain all the material
information that would be reasonably required to make informed judgment of
the offer by the investors or their professional advisors.  The onus is on the
issuer to determine whatever information they believe would be useful for
investors or their financial advisors to make educated investment decisions.
In addition to this so-called “general disclosure test,” the CA also requires the
issuer to disclose categorically rights and liabilities attached to the underlying
securities, and the operational records and financial health of the issuer.
Section 711 is concerned with the terms and conditions of the offer, the
formation and promotion of the issuer, and interest and fees paid to the
persons involved in the making of the offer.  Sections 714 and 715 deal with
the disclosure of risks associated with the offer, the nature of the issuer’s
business and the use of funds to be raised through the prospectus.  Therefore,
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2003).
94. Report of the Attorney-General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario para. 5.09
(Toronto:  Queen’s Printer, 1965).
95. Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O., c. S.5 § 56(1) (1990) (Can.).
a cursory construal of the requirements of disclosure in prospectuses shows
that the issuers are obligated to disclose certain information to a reasonable
extent in addition to general disclosure requirements.  It would be a
contravention of these requirements for the prospectus to contain misleading
or deceptive statements and omit from the prospectus a fact which was
required to have been included.
Both civil and criminal liabilities apply to the contravention of
section 728(1).90  Ascribing criminal liability for the contravention of
section 728(1), section 728(3) provides that it will be an offence if the
misleading or deceptive statement or omission or new circumstance is
“materially adverse from the point of view of an investor.”91  To identify the
breach of this section, it has been stated that “criminal liability is imposed
where the result of a contravention of section 728(1) was that ‘bad news’ was
withheld from investors.”92
The above discussion shows the criminal liability applies to the violation
of prospectus requirements; persons liable for such violation are discussed
below.  It may be noted here that post-Enron legal reforms in Australia did not
affect these provisions.
Canadian securities laws, like those in the USA and Australia, require
companies willing to go public to obtain regulatory approval for issuing
prospectuses to the public.  There are both long and short forms of
prospectuses.  Generally a prospectus under Ontario securities law should
contain all material information regarding “the company, business,
management, finances, existing securities, and the securities being
qualified.”93  The prospectus should be drafted in such a simple manner that
investors generally can read it.94  The responsibility of the securities regulator
is to ensure that prospectuses embody “full, true, and plain disclosure of
material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distributed and
shall comply with the requirements of Ontario securities law.”95
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96. See id. § 122(1).  Offences, general:  § 122
(1) Every person or company that,
(a) makes a statement in any material, evidence or information submitted to the Commission,
a Director, any person acting under the authority of the Commission or the Executive Director or
any person appointed to make an investigation or examination under this Act that, in a material
respect and at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is misleading
or untrue or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the
statement not misleading;
(b) makes a statement in any application, release, report, preliminary prospectus, prospectus,
return, financial statement, information circular, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular or other
document required to be filed or furnished under Ontario securities law that, in a material respect
and at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is misleading or untrue
or does not state a fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not
misleading; or
(c) contravenes Ontario securities law, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine
of not more than $5 million or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years less a day, or
to both.  1994, c. 11, s. 373; 2002, c. 22, s. 181 (1).
Exemption
(1.1) Clauses (1)(a) and (b) do not apply to a statement made or given to the Commission in a
submission in respect of a proposed rule or policy.
97. Johnston, supra note 94, at 271.
The OSA’90 makes certain disclosure or non-disclosure of material facts
a punishable offence.  Offences have been split into three types:  general
offences, offences by directors and/or officers; and offences relating to insider
trading.  General offences are contained in section 122(1) of the OSA’90.96
It is a general offence under section 122(1)(a) to submit to the Ontario
Securities Commission (OSC) or its (OSC’s) representatives statements that
are misleading, untrue or omits to include material facts.  Section 122(1)(b)
provides that the inclusion of any statement made in any required documents
including prospectuses that is misleading or untrue or contains omission in
respect of a material fact is an offence.  Section 122(1)(c) is wider than the
preceding two sections.  According to section 122(1)(c), any contraventions
of securities laws of Ontario are punishable offences.  The expression
“misleading, untrue or contains omissions” as embodied in sections 122(1)(a)
& (b) encapsulates the statutory definition of “misrepresentation” contained
in section 1(1) of the OSA’90.  Given the wider scope of section 122(1)(c), it
has been argued that any offensive violation of Ontario securities legislation
can be prosecuted under this penal provision.97
In addition to the above provisions, the post-Enron amendment inserted
sections 126.1 and 126.2 as alluded to earlier.  Section 126.1 is concerned
with fraud and market manipulation.  It provides that:
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A person or company shall not, directly or indirectly, engage or participate in any act,
practice or course of conduct relating to securities or derivatives of securities that the
person or company knows or reasonably ought to know, (a) results in or contributes to
a misleading appearance of trading activity in, or an artificial price for, security or
derivative of a security; or (b) perpetrates a fraud on any person or company.
Section 126.2 prohibits persons and companies from making a misleading
or untrue statement in relation to securities.  It reads that:
A person or company shall not make a statement that the person or company knows or
reasonably ought to know, (a) in a material respect and at the time and in the light of
circumstances under which it is made, is misleading or untrue or does not state a fact that
is required to be stated or that is necessary to make the statement not misleading; and
(b) significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on,
the market price or value of a security.
Under the above two new sections, it is a criminal offence to issue a defective
prospectus for raising funds from the public for firms.
It is apparent from the preceding discussions of the legal provisions of the
United States, Australia and Canada that disclosure requirements of
prospectuses are wide and the onus is on the issuer to determine the content
and extent of information to be included in a prospectus.  However, Australia
prescribes some specific information to be disclosed.  All these jurisdictions
impose criminal liability for defective prospectuses but none of the three
categorically identifies the persons who are criminally liable for such a
prospectus.  It must be noted that neither the U.S. nor Australia has amended
the relevant provisions discussed above following the Enron effects on their
domestic markets, but Ontario has added new sections by defining fraudulent
conduct with regard to corporate disclosure that may trigger criminal
liabilities for defective prospectuses.
CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF AUDITORS AND LAWYERS FOR DEFECTIVE
PROSPECTUSES UNDER SECURITIES LAWS
Statutory provisions are not clear in the U.S. whether an accountant or
attorney should be held criminally liable for a defective prospectus.  Criminal
liabilities for defective prospectuses have been imposed under section 24 of
the SA’33.  This section reads that:
Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this title [SA’33], or the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commission under the authority thereof, or any
person who willfully, in a registration statement filed under this title, makes any untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein
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or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be
fined . . . or imprisoned. . . .
Section 17 of the SA’33 proscribes fraudulent interstate transactions in
securities that include “offer or sale of any securities.”  Such conduct is
“unlawful for any person” that may be involved in these transactions.  But it
does not clearly impose liability on particular persons.
Provisions regarding lodgment of prospectus with the SEC are clear.
Unless exempted, companies willing to go public are required to lodge a
registration statement98 and prospectus99 with the SEC for floatation; the
contents of these documents are prescribed in sections 7 and 10 respectively.
Sections 11 and 12 provide for civil liabilities for defective registration
statements and prospectuses.  Every person including directors, underwriters,
auditors and lawyers may be liable for defective prospectuses under
section 11.100
With regard to the importance of the role of accountants and lawyers,
statutory provisions have been judicially interpreted in favour of accountants’
criminal liability alongside the existence of civil liability.  In State v. Tarzian
the Court of Appeal of Arizona affirmed the criminal conviction of the
accountant for auditing the accounts of the company which lodged misleading
information with the securities regulator.101  In applying criminal liability
provisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit highlighted the
need for investigation by accountants before providing a certificate of fairness
and rejected the plea of ignorance.  The court observed that the certificates of
accountants in relation to corporate disclosures “can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss” on investors.102
Further, it is generally argued that the profession of auditors plays a
crucial role in presenting a distorted financial position of the issuer.103  Similar
to the position of accountants, lawyers have been held primarily liable by
several courts for a defective prospectus.104  Therefore, both auditors and
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attorneys in the U.S. are held criminally liable for defective prospectuses
although statutory provisions do not categorically name them.  Their
involvement in the preparation of prospectuses attracts this liability.
In Australia, as discussed previously, auditors are now civilly liable for
economic loss or damages suffered by investors in reliance on the audit report
included in a prospectus.  In addition to the liability under the tort of
negligence, auditors and attorneys are also liable to investors for defective
prospectuses under section 729 and possibly section 1041, where they are
found responsible for the incorporation of false and misleading statement in
the prospectus.105  Recently some statutory changes have been made to
professionals’ civil liability in Australia.  The CLERPA’04 introduced
proportionate liability provisions by amending the relevant legislation.106
According to these amendments, an auditor or lawyer can be held liable only
for that portion of damages, arising from misleading and deceptive conduct,
which is judged to have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.107  This
provision applies to all defendants including auditors and lawyers who
concurrently commit a wrong that gives rise to economic loss or damage to
property.  All of these liability provisions deal with civil liability:  they do not
apply to fraudulent or deceptive conduct that may attract criminal liability.108
Nonetheless it is important to note here that the persons who are civilly liable
for defective prospectuses may arguably be criminally liable if the misleading
or deceptive statement or omission is materially adverse from the point of
view of an investor as described in section 728(3) of the CA’01.  It must be
mentioned that while section 728(3) of the CA’01 makes raising funds by a
company by issuing a prospectus containing misleading and deceptive
statement which is “materially adverse” to investors a serious offence,109 the
question of professionals’  liability remains unclear.
According to section 700(3) of the CA’01, the issuing company is clearly
liable.  But in the absence of judicial interpretation of this section, it is quite
uncertain whether this liability is limited to the issuer only, or extended to
others involved in the preparation of a prospectus.110  Arguably, it may apply
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114. Section 1041E:  False or misleading statements
(1) A person must not (whether in this jurisdiction or elsewhere) make a statement, or disseminate
information, if:
(a) the statement or information is false in a material particular or is materially misleading; and
(b) the statement or information is likely:
(i) to induce persons in this jurisdiction to apply for financial products; or
(ii) to induce persons in this jurisdiction to dispose of or acquire financial products; or
(iii) to have the effect of increasing, reducing, maintaining or stabilising the price for trading
in financial products on a financial market operated in this jurisdiction; and
(c) when the person makes the statement, or disseminates the information:
(i) the person does not care whether the statement or information is true or false; or
(ii) the person knows, or ought reasonably to have known, that the statement or information
is false in a material particular or is materially misleading.
Note 1:  Failure to comply with this subsection is an offence (see subsection 1311(1)).  For defences
to a prosecution based on this subsection, see Division 4.
Note 2:  Failure to comply with this subsection may also lead to civil liability under section 1041I.
For relief from liability under that section, see Division 4.
to the individuals by operation of section 52 of the CA’01 which explains the
meaning of doing an act by saying that “[a] reference to doing an act or thing
includes a reference to causing or authorising the act or thing to be done.”
Referring to this section, it has been argued that “a person who caused or
authorised the offer is also treated as having made it and can therefore
contravene section 728(1).”111
Section 729 of the CA2001 categorically imposes civil liability for
defective prospectuses on the issuer, present and proposed directors,
underwriters, a person named in the prospectus with their consent as having
made a statement included in the disclosure, and “a person who contravenes,
or is involved in the contravention of, subsection 728(1)” of the CA’01.
Arguably, a plain and simple interpretation of this section may imply that all
members of an IPO coalition are civilly liable under this section and that this
was the intention of the government in inserting Chapter 6D in the CA’01 by
the CLERP Act 1999.112  But some writers observe that this section does not
apply to criminal liability.113
In addition to section 728 of the CA’01, sections 1041E-1041G of this
Act also prohibits misleading, deceptive or dishonest conduct in relation to
dealing with financial products.  These provisions complement section 728 in
imposing prohibition on the issuance of defective disclosure for raising
corporate funds.  Section 1041E114 clearly says that “it is an offence to
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knowingly, recklessly, or negligently make a false or misleading statement or
disseminate such information where it is likely, inter alia, to induce a person
to acquire financial products.”115  Unlike section 728, section 1041E(3)
imposes strict liability on the offenders.  Inducement to deal in a financial
product by misleading, false or deceptive conduct made knowingly, or
recklessly is prohibited under section 1041F.  Section 1041G proscribes
dishonest conduct of financial service providers in relation to financial
product.  All these sections prohibit “a person” from violating the above
prohibitions.  Section 1041E prohibits a person from “making” false or
misleading statement; section 1041F provides that “a person” must not
“induce” another person to deal with securities, and section 1041G forbids “a
person” to “engage” in dishonest conduct in relation to financial products.
The meanings of these three terms, make, induce and engage, are not provided
in the CA’01 and are therefore open for judicial interpretations.  Arguably, an
auditor and attorney may be held criminally liable under the above sections.
However, absent some judicial interpretations by competent courts, Australian
securities law seems unclear as to whether auditors and lawyers are criminally
liable for a defective prospectus.116
Like the abovementioned Australian and U.S. law, Canadian law does not
specifically name anyone who should be held liable for an offence under this
section.  Instead sections 122(1), 126.1 and 126.2 of the OSA’90 impose
liability on every person or company that makes a defective statement
included in a prospectus and submitted to securities commission or issued to
the public.  It seems very wide but is still vague in respect of the identify of
persons to be held liable.  This is so because it does not explain who is
considered to have “made” the prospectus.  As mentioned previously, a
prospectus is typically prepared jointly by promoters, directors, auditors,
lawyers, issue managers and underwriters.  Hence a simple interpretation of
the expression “every person or company” or “a person or company” may
imply that either all of these individuals or the issuer per se is liable for an
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offence under this section.  Ontario law puts more emphasis on the individuals
whilst U.S. and Australian law place blame on the issuer first.
DEFENCES AVAILABLE TO AUDITORS
The U.S. legislation provides a wide scope of defence to this liability that
requires the plaintiff to prove both mens rea or scienter and actus reus.  A
person can be held liable under section 24 of the SA’33 only if the wrongful
act or omission is done willfully as clearly articulated in the text of the
section.117  It may not be very difficult to prove actus reus, but proving
willfulness may be hard.  However, as regards civil action, it was held by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC that scienter is not a necessary element
to be established for a successful suit under section 17 of the SA’33.118
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether scienter is an essential element for a
criminal case under section 17 of the SA’33.
A number of defences are available to both civil and criminal liability for
flouting prospectus requirements in Australia.119  These defences are contained
in sections 731 to 733 of the CA’01.  A defendant will be acquitted from
criminal liability under section 728(3) if a single defence can be established.
However, defences available vary between defendants “depending on the type
of disclosure document, the nature of defect and the identity of the person”
trying to rely on the defence.  These defences applicable to prospectuses are:
reasonable inquiries about the facts in question, reasonable reliance on expert
opinions or on documents, withdrawal of consent to be named in the
prospectus, and lack of factual awareness.
Defying the common law provisions espoused in the landmark judgment
of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek, a legislative reform introduced under
the Directors Liability Act 1890 (UK) allowed subscribers to sue directors of
an issuer of prospectus without proving the knowing or reckless disclosure of
misleading or defective statements in a prospectus.  However a statutory
defence was made available that the defendant had reasonable grounds to
believe the truth of the impugned prospectus statement.  This provision
basically imposed a “burden of disproof” on defendants that the inclusion of
the misleading or defective statement did not result from their deliberate or
reckless conduct.  Borrowing from that legislative spirit, all of the defences
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incorporated in the CA’01 entitle the defendants to disprove the claim of
guilty leveled against them by subscribers, and subscribers are no longer
required to prove the guilt of the defendant.
Reasonable Inquiries Defence:  Section 731
This defence requires the defendant to properly inquire about the fact of
the statement and based on this inquiry the defendant should make a
reasonable decision that the statement is not misleading or deceptive.  If the
allegation is about omission of material fact from the prospectus, the
defendant must make sure that his/her inquiries did not find any omission as
alleged subsequently.  The successful arguments for this defence will enable
the defendant to escape liability.  This defence applies to all persons who are
potentially liable for a breach of section 728(1) of the CA’01.
There is no single definition of “reasonable inquiry.”  The reasonability
of inquiry will be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on the
circumstances surrounding a particular offer.  In this regard courts “would
have regard to established best practice in the preparation and verification of
prospectuses.”120  That is, persons of each category such as directors,
professionals, underwriters and issue managers will have to play their due role
by employing their best effort in order to know the truth before including a
statement in a prospectus.  Failure to carry out this query may attract criminal
liability.
This defence broadly resembles the defence of due diligence, which was
a statutory defence in Australia until 2000.  Although a true due diligence
defence no longer exists in the CA’01 following the commencement of the
CLERPA’99 from March 2000, the requirements embodied in the amended
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121. Section 731 Due diligence defence for prospectuses
Reasonable inquiries and reasonable belief—statements
(1) A person does not commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under section
729 for a contravention of subsection 728(1), because of a misleading or deceptive statement in a
prospectus if the person proves that they:
(a) made all inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances; and
(b) after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that the statement was not misleading or
deceptive.
Reasonable inquiries and reasonable belief—omissions
(2) A person does not commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under section
729 for a contravention of subsection 728(1), because of an omission from a prospectus in relation
to a particular matter if the person proves that they:
(a) made all inquiries (if any) that were reasonable in the circumstances; and
(b) after doing so, believed on reasonable grounds that there was no omission from the
prospectus in relation to that matter.
122. For further details, see BAXT ET AL., supra note 92, at 158.
123. Corporations Act, 2001, § 733(1) (Austl.):
(1) A person does not commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under section
729 for a contravention against subsection 728(1), because of a misleading or deceptive statement
in, or an omission from, a disclosure document if the person proves that they placed reasonable
reliance on information given to them by:
(a) if the person is a body-someone other than a director, employee or agent of the body; or
(b) if the person is an individual-someone other than an employee or agent of the individual.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is not the agent of a body or individual merely
because they perform a particular professional or advisory function for the body or individual.
section 731121 exercising due diligence appear to be still relevant and helpful
in establishing the reasonable inquiry defence.122
Reasonable Reliance Defence—Section 733(1)
This defence provides that a person is neither civilly nor criminally liable
for the contravention of section 728(1) if the defendant can prove that he/she
reasonably relied on information provided by another person.  However, there
are some qualifications with regard to that other person.  According to this
section, defendants are required to prove that they “placed reasonable reliance
on information given to them:  (a) if the person is a body, by someone other
than a director, employee or agent of the body; or (b) if the person is an
individual, by someone other than an employee or agent of the individual.”123
Section 733(3) contains some exclusion provisions unfavourable to
professionals including auditors and lawyers.  According to these provisions,
persons providing professional or advisory services to a defendant under
section 728 are not an agent of the recipient of the service merely through
acting in that capacity.  Therefore an auditor or lawyer working for a
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125. Corporations Act, 2001, § 773(3) (Austl.):
Withdrawal of consent-statements and omissions
A person who is named in a disclosure document as:
(a) being a proposed director or underwriter; or
(b) making a statement included in the document; or
(c) making a statement on the basis of which a statement is included in the document; does not
commit an offence against subsection 728(3), and is not liable under section 729 for a contravention
against subsection 728(1), because of a misleading or deceptive statement in, or an omission from,
a disclosure document if the person proves that they publicly withdrew their consent to being named
in the document in that way.
corporation in the preparation of a prospectus cannot bind the corporation for
his/her faults.  Professionals themselves shall be liable for their fault
committed in providing in their service.  Therefore, professionals must be
diligent and careful in examining the relevant documents depending on the
relevant circumstances.
This is indeed a good defence for the issuer, directors, and promoters.
However, a blind reliance is not an acceptable defence.  Reliance on the
opinion of another person must be reasonable.  Before putting reliance on the
information provided by a third party, the defendant must be concerned about
the capability and expertise of the professional or advisor concerned.  One
cannot knowingly rely on the information provided by a person who is not
generally involved in providing that sort of service.  That is, financial advice
must be obtained from a qualified accountant, not from a highly reputed
lawyer.  In this respect, the term “reasonable” entails that the defendant
seeking this defence to rely on “should have acted reasonably in regard to
circumstances which it knew or ought to have known.”124  Otherwise, the
defence should be unavailable.
Withdrawal of Consent Defence:  Section 733(3)
Any person involved in the preparation of a prospectus and whose name
would be included in it, may decide to withdraw his/her name from the
prospectus before its publication, on the ground that the prospectus contains
some misleading or defective statement or omits to state some material facts
in it.  The persons who are entitled to take advantage of this defence are:
directors, promoters, underwriters and professionals including auditors and
lawyers.
Section 733(3)125 does not clearly state when and how the withdrawal
should be effected.  However, it is assumed from its predecessor,
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statement was misleading or untrue or that it omitted to state a fact that was required to be stated or that
was necessary to make the statement not misleading in light of the circumstances in which it was made.
section 1009(3) of the Corporations Law, that on becoming aware of the
defects of the prospectus the withdrawal with reasons should be made public
any time before the allotment of securities under the prospectus.126  Both the
time and way of withdrawal are significant to investors because the potential
subscribers must be reasonably informed of such withdrawals.  From this
point of view, the absence of this clarity appears to be a loophole which needs
to be made clear immediately.  This shortcoming may lead to acquittal of true
offenders in criminal cases.
Similar to the available defence in the U.S., the above discussions show
that the scienter element is required to be proved for a successful prosecution
in Australia as well.  It is a difficult task to prove and therefore the defendants
have ample scope to escape criminal liability for defective prospectuses.
Similar to the other two jurisdictions, a wide range of defences are
available to the offence committed under section 122(1) of the OSA’90 in
Canada.  Section 122(2) makes the same defences available to both
individuals and issuers.  These defences are:  ignorance and “the exercise of
reasonable diligence.”  This section provides that neither the individuals nor
the issuer will be held liable for a defective prospectus where ‘the person or
company did not know and in the exercise of reasonable diligence could not
have known’ the defect of the prospectus.  Ignorance includes both:  ignorance
of the defect in the disclosure and ignorance of the circumstances which
require that a prospectus be free from misleading statements.127
These defences are wider than those available in the U.S. and Australia.
This is so because ignorance of the circumstances under which a prospectus
should be free from misleading statements may also be a defence.  Such a
wide scope of defence virtually weakens the liability regime.
It can be inferred from the above discussion that offenders may escape
criminal liability in all of the three jurisdictions taking advantage of explicit
defences and/or ambiguities present in the liability provisions.
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PENAL SANCTIONS FOR OFFENCES RELATED TO DISCLOSURES
IN PROSPECTUSES
Section 24 of the SA’33 in the U.S. limits the amount of fine up to U.S.
$10,000 that can be imposed on a defendant upon conviction.  A defendant
can be either fined or imprisoned for a period of not more than five years, or
can be punished with both on conviction under section 24 of the SA’33.128  It
does not distinguish between individuals and issuers in respect of penalties.
The post-Enron reform, the SOX’02, has considerably enhanced the
penalties for the violation of securities fraud provisions under the SEA’34
which primarily applies to the secondary market.  As mentioned earlier, the
SOX’02 may also apply to the IPO market as well.  In that case, the maximum
fine and imprisonment are U.S. $5 million and 20 years respectively where the
offender is a natural person.129  In the case of a person other than a natural
person, the maximum fine has been increased from U.S. $2.5 million to U.S.
$25 million.130  However its applicability to prospectuses is doubtful, as it
does not amend the prospectus-related legal provisions.
The term of maximum imprisonment is the same, five years, in the U.S.
and Australia.131  But a big difference is evident if the SOX’02 applies to the
IPO market, because the term of imprisonment has been increased up to 20
years.  The pecuniary penalties are also different.  According to schedule 3 of
the CA’01, the sanction applicable to individuals for committing an offence
section 728(3) is either 200 penalty units or imprisonment for a period of five
years or both.  As explained in section 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a
penalty unit is equivalent to AU $110.  Therefore the amount of pecuniary
penalty awardable against an auditor would be AU $22,000 (US $16,500
approx) for the contravention of prospectus requirements set forth in
section 728 of the CA’01, which is considerably different from the U.S.
equivalent mentioned above.
Similar sanctions apply to the violation of sections 1041E-1041G of the
CA’01 as stated in schedule 3 of the CA’01.  These three sections generally
prohibit any false or misleading statements or dishonest concealment of
material facts in relation to financial products under the CA’01.  Therefore,
this penal section may also apply to disclosure in prospectuses.  However, it
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Every director or officer of a company or of a person other than an individual who authorizes,
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person, whether or not a charge has been laid or a finding of guilt has been made against the
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does not make a significant difference in that the sanctions are identical to
those prescribed under section 728(3).  Individuals and corporations have been
treated equally, unlike the SOX’02.
Section 122(1) of the OSA’90 in Canada provides for sanctions against
both individuals and corporations equally.  An individual or the issuer can be
punished on conviction for an offence under this section with “a fine of not
more than CA $5 million (US $4.3 million) or to imprisonment for a term of
not more than five years less a day, or to both.”  This penalty is applicable to
the offenders who “make” a defective statement embraced in a prospectus.
Previously, the maximum fine was CA $1 million and the term of
imprisonment was two years.  These sanctions were enhanced in 2002 in the
aftermath of Enron.132
Alongside section 122(1), section 122(3) deals only with directors and
officers “who authorizes, permits or acquiesces in the commission of an
offence under subsection (1) [§ 122(1)] by the company or person, whether or
not a charge has been laid or a finding of guilt has been made against the
company or person in respect of the offence under subsection (1). . . .”  Such
an authorisation, permission or acquiescence in the commission of an offence
has been made punishable with the same sanctions applicable to the “making”
of the aforementioned defective statement.133
It should be noted that these two sections, section 122(1) and
section 122(3), are different in respect of both the persons liable for the
offence and the nature of offences.  Section 122(1) deals with committing the
offence, whereas section 122(3) concerns authorisation, permission or
acquiescence in the commission of an offence.  Both subsections are relevant
to the role of auditors and lawyers, because they may be subject to both
primary and secondary liabilities in Canada depending on the role they played
in a given prospectus, as discussed earlier.
It is interesting to notice that all three jurisdictions provide for a
maximum term of five years imprisonment for prospectus offences, except for
SOX’02 provisions.  Both in the U.S. and Australia, the five-year term was in
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place before the Enron effects, but Canada increased this term from two years
to five years in response to Enron and some domestic incidents.  Canada has
also increased pecuniary penalties from CA $1 million to CA $5 million (US
$4.3 million), where Australia trails some distance behind with its lower
pecuniary penalties.
CONCLUSIONS
After recent mega-scandals of corporate bankruptcy, public confidence
in the quality of services provided by auditors has been dazed and quick
legislative measures have been taken to prevent corporate malpractices.134
The auditors’ role is perhaps the most important of many roles played by
accounting professionals and thereby they work as a gatekeeper in line with
other professionals such as securities lawyers and merchant bankers.135
However, the role of lawyers is also very important because primary functions
of securities lawyers are to assist the underwriters in exercising due diligence
in the preparation of a prospectus and to ascertain that the prospectus complies
with all the legal requirements.136  As members of the coalition, underwriters,
attorneys and accountants jointly provide credible assurance to investors that
prospectus disclosures are accurate.137  It is thus reasonably argued that “the
current post-Enron atmosphere demands more from capital market
gatekeepers.”138
The foregoing investigation of the prospectus liability regimes in the U.S.,
Australia and Canada reveals some similarities and differences amongst these
jurisdictions with regard to the offensive conduct, persons liable for that
conduct, defences available to that liability and penalties enforceable upon
conviction.  A great similarity persists in relation to the identification of
persons who should be held liable.  All three jurisdictions seem to impose
liability on any person who is involved in the issuance of securities, although
different terms have been used.  Expressions of law regarding the identity of
persons who are potentially liable for defective prospectuses are ambiguous.
Such an ambiguity is favorable to offenders who are entitled to take advantage
of the “benefit of doubt,” a fundamental principle of the administration of
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criminal justice utilised all over the world.  This is so because the legislation
does not provide any meaning of “making” the offer or “offering” of securities
or “engaging” in such activities.  Therefore, it is uncertain that an auditor or
lawyer must fall within the purview of such expressions.  However, some U.S.
cases have been cited in which professionals like auditors and lawyers were
held liable for defective prospectuses.  Clarity of the purpose and purview of
the law is essential for its effective enforcement.  The operation of capital
markets is a complex combination of the roles of several professions.  Legal
certainty in respect of all aspects of this market is necessary for its smooth
functioning.139  It has been argued that for the protection of investors140 and
development of a robust capital market, clear and reliable laws for fair play
should be in place.141  Therefore, the legislation should categorically include,
amongst others, auditors and attorneys142 as potentially liable persons
facilitating smooth enforcement of the law.
Defences available appear to be very wide and therefore those should be
revisited.  For example, the gist of the defences in all the jurisdictions at hand
implies that the accused can be punished only for wilful disclosure or non-
disclosure in a prospectus.  The U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in
this regard underscored the need for participation in the alleged offence in
order to establish a prima facie case against the accused.143  A similar
observation was made in Christoffel v. Hutton & Company.144  In interpreting
the term “willful” in the present context,145 the court in United States v.
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Schwartz said that a violation is wilful even if there is no “bad purpose” or no
“specific intent to violate the law.”146  In a similar context, the Court of
Appeals of Arizona in State v. Tarzian construed the term “wilfully” by saying
that:
. . .when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a
purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make the omission referred to.  It does not
require any intent to violate law, or injure another or to acquire any advantage.147
Despite such liberal interpretation of the term “wilful,” the wilful requirement
had been omitted in 1998 (under section 44-1992) from the Securities Act of
Arizona 1951 in an identical context.  Thus Arizona has made the criminal
liability strict in 1998 without any defence therefore providing better
protection to the investors.  Thus it is submitted that the requirement of
“willful commission of prospectus offences,” in whatever term it is expressed,
be omitted and that liability be imposed depending on the role played by an
individual in the preparation of a prospectus.  As discussed earlier, “the
prospectus is a group effort:  the collective work product of the issuer, its
lawyers and accountants, and the underwriters (and their lawyers).”148  In
support of strict liability, it has been argued that “[i]t is impossible for an
outsider to identify who is responsible for a particular statement in a
prospectus.”149
Interestingly, the post-Enron reforms taking place in the U.S., Australia
and Canada are not clear enough in respect of their applicability to
prospectuses.  Judicial interpretations of their applicability to prospectuses are
not available as of yet.  Expert opinions differ.  Some American experts are
of the view that the SOX’02 applies to the prospectus regime as well, whilst
some Australian experts opine that CLERPA’04 is not applicable to
prospectus disclosures.  But both the SOX’02 and the CLERPA’04 explicitly
amend the laws governing corporate disclosure in the secondary securities
market.  Hence, it is recommended that respective legislatures should make it
clear whether those reforms really affect their prospectus liability regimes,
similar to the way their Canadian equivalent has been clearly made applicable
to prospectuses.
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As observed in the preceding discussions, some provisions are remarkably
similar across jurisdictions; but some others are highly divergent.  Incidentally
the term of imprisonment is identical, but pecuniary penalties are significantly
different.  Given the similarity amongst these jurisdictions as alluded to
earlier, provisions for equivalent fines may be introduced especially by
increasing the fines enforceable in Australia.  Commenting on the justification
of stringent regulation of auditors, Birke maintains by making reference to the
situation prevailing in the U.S. that audit is vital for a national economy and
“audit’s genesis lies in the Securities Acts.”150  Supporting this view, Harrison
argues that accountants and lawyers do not merely blow the whistle, they help
the corporations commit the fraud.151  The existence of repeated corporate
collapses over the years around the globe implies that the issue of regulation
of auditors should not be left solely with their own professional body; rather,
stringent legislation is needed.152  When the securities market was in
“complete disarray” following the aftershock of the 1929 crash, Roosevelt’s
appeal to the U.S. Congress was to legislate a law that “puts the burden of
telling the whole truth on the seller” of securities in order to “bring back
investor confidence.”153  Since auditors and lawyers play a very significant
role in telling that truth, securities laws should be strengthened in order to
regulate auditors and lawyers effectively.
